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ABSTRACT This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s
ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their
private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock
prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock
price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate
future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association
between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is
reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that
have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our
study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices
about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper
this improvement.
1. Introduction
This paper aims to examine whether stock-based compensation benefits shareholders by improv-
ing their ability to predict future firm performance. Previous evidence on the effectiveness of
such compensation schemes is mixed, as prior studies are largely based on tests of the sensitivity
of CEO pay with respect to shareholder value, that is, pay-to-performance sensitivity measures
(see e.g. Frydman & Saks, 2010; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In addition,
while some studies suggest that stock-based compensation can mitigate ‘managerial disclosure
agency problems’ and, thus, induce managers to disclose more (e.g. Nagar, Nanda, & Wysocki,
2003), it remains unknown whether such disclosures actually convey any meaningful infor-
mation to shareholders (Barth, 2003). This study aims to offer an analysis and discussion of
whether the information provided by equity-compensated managers improves firms’ information
environment. We particularly focus on how a CEO’s equity incentives affect the extent to which
stock prices reflect information about future earnings. Following previous studies (Choi, Myers,
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Zang, & Ziebart, 2011; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Lund-
holm & Myers, 2002; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006), we measure the informativeness of current
stock prices in relation to future earnings using the future earnings response coefficient (FERC).1
The existing literature presents opposing expectations regarding the effect of equity incentives
on the informativeness of stock prices. One stream of the literature predicts that higher stock-
based incentives result in improved voluntary disclosures by firms. For example, Nagar et al.
(2003) suggest that managers who are otherwise reluctant to share their private information
with shareholders will be induced to disclose more if they are compensated based on equity
value. When firms offer stock-based compensation to new employees, voluntary disclosures
can also reduce the contracting costs that arise due to the potential mispricing of stock prices
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Noe (1999) further indicates that managers provide earnings forecasts
to resolve information asymmetry issues with outside shareholders before trading their stocks.
Consistent with these arguments, firms that provide more stock-based compensation are found
to make more voluntary disclosures than other firms. If stock-based incentives encourage man-
agers to reveal their private information about future performance to the market, shareholders
will be better able to predict future earnings (the informative disclosure argument).
However, it has been widely reported that managers who are compensated based on equity
tend to engage in earnings management to maximize their remuneration (Bergstresser & Philip-
pon, 2006; Burns & Kedia, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Cheng, Warfield, & Ye, 2011). Man-
agers with more stock-based compensation are more likely to distort earnings to inflate their
firms’ stock prices before exercising options or selling their shares (Bergstresser & Philippon,
2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005). Furthermore, granting options can create an incentive for man-
agers to temporarily depress a stock price prior to the option award date by managing earnings
downward or issuing voluntary disclosures (Baker, Collins, & Reitenga, 2003, 2009; McAnally,
Srivastava, & Weaver, 2008). If managers with equity-based incentives temporarily manipulate
the stock price, this price will fail to represent the firm’s fundamental value. The distortion of
short-term earnings by those managers also deteriorates investors’ ability to predict future
firm performance, as shareholders and analysts often use current earnings information to formu-
late the expected firm value. Thus, stock-based compensation may weaken the informativeness
of current stock prices in relation to future earnings (the opportunistic manipulation argument).
In this study, an enhanced FERC implies that more information in quantity and/or more accu-
rate information about future earnings is provided by an equity-compensated manager so that
investors can better incorporate such information into their trades. We believe that the FERC
is more appropriate for our study than alternative measures for the following reasons. First, a
direct measure of management forecast accuracy does not consider the various channels
through which managers are able to communicate their private information with shareholders,
such as press releases, conference calls, or social and environmental reporting. In addition,
using the forecast accuracy measure would limit our sample to only those firms that issue man-
agement forecasts.
Second, the FERC is particularly suitable for testing our research questions compared with
other short-term earnings-based measures such as the earnings response coefficient (ERC).
The analytical model of firm valuation developed by Zhang (2000) and further empirical evi-
dence provided by Chen and Zhang (2007) indicate that a firm’s current earnings information
is not sufficient to explain variations in stock prices. In particular, Chen and Zhang (2007)
suggest that four factors – earnings yield, capital investment, and changes in profitability and
1We later explain why the FERC is more appropriate for examining the effect of stock-based incentives on the informa-
tiveness of stock prices than other short-term-oriented measures.
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growth opportunities – mainly account for current stock movements. Because these factors
relate to current and future cash flows, the ERC cannot fully capture the variation in stock
prices arising from changes in investors’ expectations regarding future cash flows. In the first
study introducing the FERC, Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994) report a significant
increase in the explanatory power of the return-earnings model after including future earnings.
This result occurs because although realized earnings information may be a good indicator of
future earnings, investors predict future performance after combining this information with
information from other sources. Investors might change their trading strategies based on antici-
pated events that affect future earnings but not current earnings. This effect will be captured in
the FERC, but not necessarily in the ERC (Collins et al., 1994; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006).2 In our
research setting, we test whether further disclosures provided by equity-compensated managers
are sufficiently informative to affect current returns through changes in investors’ expectations
regarding future earnings.
Based on a sample of 12,213 firm-year observations of S&P 1500 firms during the 1995–2007
period, our analyses yield the following main findings. First, we find that CEO stock-based com-
pensation is significantly positively associated with the FERC, indicating that when firms
provide a higher amount of stock-based compensation to their CEOs, their stock prices
become more informative of future earnings. This finding supports the informative disclosure
argument that disclosures by equity-incentivized managers can mitigate disclosure agency pro-
blems. Second, consistent with our prediction, we find that the effect of stock-based compen-
sation on the FERC is less pronounced for firms with a greater magnitude of earnings
management. That is, the positive effect appears to be weaker when managers with a higher pro-
portion of equity-based compensation attempt to pursue their own self-interest by managing
earnings. Although this result is consistent with the opportunistic manipulation argument, our
overall findings suggest that the informative disclosure incentive is dominant, as exhibited by
the (on average) positive effect of stock-based compensation on the informativeness of stock
prices.
We conduct additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to provide additional
insights. First, similar results are obtained when a continuous variable of stock-based compen-
sation is used instead of the percentile rank variable. Second, our findings are not adversely
affected by the incomplete coverage of the First Call database when the main regression
models are re-estimated after excluding observations before 1998. In addition, stock-based com-
pensation is found to remain positively associated with the FERC after the adoption of the
revised FAS123 (FAS123R). Moreover, when earnings are split into two components, near-
term (i.e. current and one-year ahead earnings) and long-term (i.e. two-year and three-year
forward earnings), the positive association is found for the longer-term future earnings but
not for the near-term earnings.
We address the potential endogeneity issue regarding stock-based compensation in two ways.
First, we re-estimate our regression models using the predicted variable calculated from a stock-
based compensation model (i.e. a two-stage analysis). The inferences from the two-stage analy-
sis are the same as those from the main tests. Second, we conduct a change analysis by utilizing
two events during our sample period: (i) the initiation of an equity-based payment scheme and
(ii) a substantial increase in such payments. We find that the FERC is increased in the post-
period (three-year period inclusive of the event year) compared with the pre-period (three-
2This notion is further supported by Choi et al. (2011), who stress the importance of the FERC, especially when exam-
ining the effect of management forecasts. They report that characteristics of management forecasts are closely related to
the FERC but rarely influence the degree to which returns reflect current-period earnings, that is, the ERC.
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year period ending at the year prior to the event). These results help to alleviate the concern that
our findings are driven by inverse causality or by other firm characteristics that may affect both
the FERC and a CEO’s compensation scheme.
In addition, we find that the positive effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC is wea-
kened for firms with less frequent management forecasts. This result is consistent with previous
studies that suggest forecast frequency represents a manager’s ability to predict future perform-
ance (Baik, Farber, & Lee, 2011; Trueman, 1986). The result can be viewed as additional support
for the informative disclosure argument, as an improvement in stock prices’ informativeness
about future earnings is not observed for firms with a low frequency of management forecasts.
Furthermore, the negative effect of equity-based compensation on the FERC for firms with a
high level of earnings management is mainly observed when managers are involved in a
larger amount of net sales in the subsequent year, thus supporting the opportunistic manipulation
argument. However, we still observe a positive effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC
for the other group (i.e. firms with managers who carry a small amount of future net sales).
Finally, we obtain the same inference regarding the positive effect of stock-based compensation
from an alternative test based on a measure of firm opacity proposed by Anderson, Duru, and
Reeb (2009). Stock-based compensation is found to be negatively associated with the opacity
of a firm’s information environment. This negative association is weaker for firms with a
higher level of earnings management or a lower frequency of management forecasts than for
other firms, consistent with our main findings.
Our results provide insights beyond those of Cheng and Lo (2006) and Noe (1999), who docu-
ment that managers who are compensated based on equity make use of management forecasts for
their own benefit. They argue that such managers achieve higher trading profits by using corpor-
ate voluntary disclosures. Our results indicate that in firms that provide stock-based compen-
sation, shareholders will also be better off as a consequence of the improved informativeness
of stock prices.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the existing literature examining the various factors that
affect firms’ information environments. Previous studies suggest that current stock prices’ infor-
mativeness about future earnings improves when firms have smooth earnings (Tucker &
Zarowin, 2006), greater analysts following and institutional ownership (Ayers & Freeman,
2003), and more informative and more frequent voluntary disclosures (Butler, Kraft, &
Weiss, 2007; Lundholm & Myers, 2002). Many of these factors are related to managers’ discre-
tionary reporting behaviors or to external factors such as analysts following that cannot be
directly controlled by shareholders. Mandating managers’ reporting patterns would not be
ideal; as Butler et al. (2007) note, only voluntary disclosures have a positive impact on the infor-
mativeness of stock prices. Our findings indicate that by providing managers with stock-based
compensation, shareholders can at least motivate them to voluntarily provide more informative
disclosures to the market, which leads to better information environments for firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, our hypotheses are
developed. The research models are then explained, along with the sample and the data used
in our empirical models. Finally, we present the results and conclude the paper.
2. Hypothesis Development
Many studies examine whether compensating CEOs based on equity through the granting of
stocks and stock options actually increases shareholder value. In an early study, Jensen and
Murphy (1990) document that CEOs received only $3.25, on average, for every $1000 increase
in shareholder wealth during the 1969–1983 period, indicating that tying CEO payment to the
value of equity does not provide CEOs with much incentive to maximize shareholder value.
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However, Hall and Liebman (1998) reach a different conclusion in their study of the 1980–1994
period. They find that the sensitivity of total CEO compensation (including salaries, bonuses and
the value of annual stock option grants) in relation to firm performance rose dramatically over
the period; the median elasticity between CEO compensation and firm market value more than
tripled from 1.2 to 3.9. The different results of these early studies can be attributed to the differ-
ent datasets and research periods involved. To resolve this issue, Frydman and Saks (2010)
examine long-term executive compensation trends using an extensive dataset of large firms
from 1936 to 2005. Their results agree with those of Hall and Liebman (1998), finding a
large increase in pay-to-performance based on two measures, the Jensen–Murphy statistic
and the value of equity at stake, during the 1980s and 1990s.
Nagar et al. (2003) approach the issue of incentive alignment through stock-based compen-
sation by focusing on disclosure agency problems. Their main argument is that managers are
more likely to communicate their private information to shareholders if their compensation is
tied more closely to the firm’s equity value. Otherwise, managers are not willing to reveal
their private information because of the possible private benefits of retaining such information.
Nagar et al. (2003) use two measures to proxy for the extent of these disclosures: the frequency
of management earnings forecasts and analysts’ ratings of disclosures taken from the Associ-
ation for Investment Management Research survey. Consistent with their conjecture, both
measures are found to be positively associated with the proportion of CEO pay linked to
stock prices. Voluntary disclosures may also reduce the contracting costs associated with
stock-based compensation. New employees whose remuneration is tied to stock prices will
require extra compensation for the additional risk they bear in case of mispriced company
stock. Thus, firms that heavily rely on stock-based compensation schemes are more likely to
make voluntary disclosures to reduce the information asymmetry between managers and share-
holders (Healy & Palepu, 2001).
However, Barth (2003) raises some issues with Nagar et al.’s (2003) findings. In particular,
Barth (2003) questions the actual benefits that shareholders gain from more frequent managerial
disclosures because stock-based compensation can also incentivize managers to distort such dis-
closures. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that managers release self-serving fore-
casts to maximize the value of their stock option awards by announcing bad news and delaying
good news around the award date. Shareholders may not use the information from managerial
disclosures if they do not know whether the managers reveal true information. Furthermore,
Barth (2003) argues that the disclosure proxies used by Nagar et al. (2003), such as the frequency
of managerial earnings forecasts, do not necessarily test whether more information is conveyed
to the market because these measures do not consider the information content. Thus, it has not
yet been determined whether CEO stock-based compensation actually leads to the enhanced
informativeness of stock prices.
Granting shares and stock options can incentivize managers to provide certain types of volun-
tary disclosures, especially surrounding insider trading. Cheng and Lo (2006) report that man-
agers engage in more selling activities during periods of increased disclosures of bad news.
Noe (1999) also indicates that insider trading tends to follow management forecasts.
However, managers will act in a subtle manner when capitalizing on private information due
to legal restrictions on insider trading. Insider trading would be associated with less sensitive
private information, such as the firm’s long-term performance, rather than biased disclosures
regarding short-term performance. In this case, shareholders will be able to learn about future
performance either directly through the private information embedded in voluntary disclosures
or indirectly by watching the managers’ trading patterns (the informative disclosure argument).
However, stock-based compensation may provide managers with an incentive to engage in
earnings management in an attempt to maximize their private benefits (Bergstresser &
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Philippon, 2006; Burns & Kedia, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Cheng et al., 2011). Higher
abnormal accruals are found in firms in which CEO compensation is more extensively linked
to the value of stock and option holdings (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). In particular, abnor-
mally high discretionary accruals are found before managers exercise abnormally large options
(Bartov & Mohanram, 2004). Managers with greater stock-based incentives are also likely to
report earnings that beat or meet analysts’ forecasts before selling their shares (Cheng & War-
field, 2005). Given the previous finding that current earnings information is useful in forecasting
future cash flows and earnings (Barth, Cram, & Nelson, 2001; Dechow, Kothari, & Watts, 1998;
Kim & Kross, 2005), distorted current earnings will not properly reflect the true performance of
the firm. Thus, disclosing such earnings may deteriorate shareholders’ ability to predict future
performance, leading to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices (the opportunistic
manipulation argument).
In sum, the two arguments presented above suggest the opposing relationships between CEO
stock-based compensation and the informativeness of stock prices. Therefore, we present the fol-
lowing null hypothesis and two competing hypotheses to test this association.
H1: CEO stock-based compensation does not have any effect on the informativeness of
stock prices in relation to future earnings.
H1a: CEO stock-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices in
relation to future earnings.
H1b: CEO stock-based compensation deteriorates the informativeness of stock prices in
relation to future earnings.
While we argue that the earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals) induced by
stock-based compensation decreases the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings
in developing H1, a higher level of discretionary accruals may capture managers’ effort to com-
municate their private information to shareholders. For instance, income smoothing can help
shareholders better estimate future earnings based on a series of past earnings information (Sub-
ramanyam, 1996; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006). However, earnings management can still be
implemented by equity-incentivized managers in a relatively short period to achieve a certain
goal, for example, to maximize payouts from option exercises (Bartov & Mohanram, 2004)
or from a disposal of shares (Cheng & Warfield, 2005). In these situations, earnings management
may or may not have a significantly negative effect on the informativeness of stock prices. Thus,
empirical tests are required to determine the dominant effect of managers’ earnings management
practices on stock price informativeness. Therefore, we propose the following additional hypoth-
esis in an alternative form.
H2: CEO stock-based compensation leads to lesser informativeness of current stock prices
in relation to future earnings when a CEO engages in upward earnings management com-
pared with when she does not manage earnings.
3. Research Design
3.1. Research Models
Following studies such as those by Collins et al. (1994), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), and Lund-
holm and Myers (2002), we use the FERC to measure the informativeness of stock prices in
relation to future earnings. The FERC is estimated using the following model adopted from
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Collins et al. (1994):
RETt = b0 + b1 × Xt−1 + b2 × Xt + b3 × Xt3 + b4 × RETt3 + 1t, (1)
where RETt is the cumulative return for fiscal year t; Xt is the income available to common share-
holders before extraordinary items, deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal
year t; Xt3 is the sum of the income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items
for years t + 1 through t + 3, deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year
t; and RETt3 is the cumulative return for fiscal years t + 1 through t + 3. The FERC is calculated
as the estimated coefficient of the sum of future earnings, b3. In the above model, Xt21 represents
the prior expectation for current earnings (Xt). Due to the mean-reverting nature of earnings, the
coefficient on Xt21 is expected to be negative and the coefficient on Xt to be positive. The realized
future earnings (Xt3) have two components: expected and unexpected components. There can be
events occurring in future periods that affect future earnings but that were not anticipated at the
end of period t. The measurement error caused by these events is controlled by future stock
returns (RETt3). The expected sign of the coefficients on Xt3 is positive and that of the coefficient
on RETt3 is negative. (See, for example, Collins et al. (1994), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), and Lund-
holm and Myers (2002) for further explanations of the FERC model.)
We then develop our test models by expanding the basic FERC model as follows:
RETt = b0 + b1 × Xt−1 + b2 × Xt + b3 × Xt3 + b4 × RETt3 + b5 × EQ COMPt
+ b6 × Xt−1 × EQ COMPt + b7 × Xt × EQ COMPt + b8 × Xt3 × EQ COMPt
+ b9 × RETt3 × EQ COMPt + Control Variables+ 1t,
(2)
where EQ_COMPt is the proportion of stock-based compensation in the CEO’s total pay,
measured as the sum of the stock option and restricted stock grant values divided by the total
pay. We estimate the preceding regression model and the other models using the percentile
rank variable of stock-based compensation to ensure that the stock-based compensation variable
is more comparable across industries. The percentile rank is measured within each industry
according to the two-digit SIC industry classification. We also check the sensitivity of the
results using the continuous variable of stock-based compensation. H1a predicts that the coeffi-
cient b8 is positive, and the opposing H1b proposes that the coefficient is negative.
To further test the cross-sectional variation in the effect of stock-based compensation on the
FERC in terms of the extent of earnings management (as stated in H2), we construct the follow-
ing additional variable:
HIGH_EM ¼ a dummy variable for the highest group of earnings management that takes
the value of one if a firm belongs to the highest quintile group of performance-matched
discretionary total accruals (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) in year t.
We then include the interaction term of the additional variable with future earnings and
EQ_COMPt in our research model as follows:
RETt = b0 + b1 × Xt−1 + b2 × Xt + b3 × Xt3 + b4 × RETt3 + b5 × EQ COMPt
+ b6 × Xt−1 × EQ COMPt + b7 × Xt × EQ COMPt + b8 × Xt3 × EQ COMPt
+ b9 × RETt3 × EQ COMPt + b10 × HIGH EMt + b11 × Xt3 × HIGH EMt
+ b12 × Xt3 × HIGH EMt × EQ COMPt + Control Variables+ 1t.
(3)
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H2 suggests that a higher level of earnings management can weaken the association between
stock-based compensation and the FERC, leading to the following prediction: b12 , 0.
To ensure that stock-based compensation does not capture the effects of other factors, we
control for a set of variables that previous research suggests affect the FERC (e.g. Choi
et al., 2011; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Lundholm & Myers, 2002). First, to control for
firms’ different information environments, we include firm size (SIZE), the number of ana-
lysts following (AC), and the number of management forecasts issued over year t
(NUM_MF). More information tends to be available for larger firms, for firms covered
by more analysts, and for firms with more management forecasts, indicating a positive
relationship between these variables and the FERC. SIZE is measured as the natural log
of the market value of total equity. AC is calculated as the natural log of one plus the
number of analysts following the firm in the month before the earnings announcement
for fiscal year t. To capture the difficulty in predicting future earnings, we add a dummy
variable for negative future earnings (LOSS) and the standard deviation of earnings for
years t through t + 3 (STD_EARN). It is relatively difficult to predict future earnings
(i.e. a lower FERC) if firms recognize a loss or have more volatile earnings. In addition,
the market is more likely to value growth firms based on their future performance, thus
leading to a higher FERC. We include a variable of firm growth (GROWTH) by measuring
the percentage growth in total assets from year t21 to t + 1. The interaction terms of these
variables with future earnings (Xt3) are also included in the regression models. Finally, we
include industry and year fixed effects in our regressions to control for potential return vari-
ations over time and across industries. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the
1% and 99% levels. The full list of variables, including definitions, is presented in
Appendix 1.
3.2. Sample and Data
Our sample consists of S&P 1500 companies during the 1995–2007 period. Firms from the
utilities and financial industries are excluded. Because the FERC model includes the next
three years of returns and firm earnings, we use data up to the year 2010. The data related
to CEO compensation are collected from ExecuComp. The financial statement data are
obtained from Compustat, and the stock price and return data are collected from Center for
Research in Security Prices. The management forecasts and analyst coverage data are col-
lected from First Call. After combining all of the datasets, we obtain 13,197 firm-year obser-
vations that have all of the variables used in the regression models. As in previous studies of
the FERC (e.g. Choi et al., 2011; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006), we delete observations in the top
and bottom 1% of the sample distributions of past, current, and future earnings and current
and future returns to minimize the effect of outliers. After deleting these outliers, we
obtain the final sample of 12,213 firm-year observations.
Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample. The yearly distribution in Panel A of
Table 1 indicates that our sample firms are evenly spread across the research period.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the distribution by industry. Nearly 40% of our sample firms
belong to the manufacturing industry, and the remaining firms are distributed across
various industries.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. The
mean of EQ_COMP is 0.4155, suggesting that approximately 42% of the CEOs’ total annual
compensation in our sample firms is in the form of options and restricted stocks. Furthermore,
we observe a large variation in EQ_COMP. Although the stock-based compensation is only 15%
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at the bottom 25% of the distribution, it is over 65% at the top 25%. On average, our sample firms
have an annual stock return (RETt) of 17%. In addition, the firms have cumulative future earn-
ings over the next three years of 14% compared with the market value of equity at the beginning
of the current year (Xt3), on average. Such positive firm performance can be attributed to our
sample selection criteria, as they relate to S&P 1500 firms. We note that the distribution of
other firm characteristics in our sample is similar to that in previous studies using the FERC
(e.g. Choi et al., 2011).3
Panel B of Table 2 presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients in the above diag-
onal (below diagonal) among the variables. As expected, the earnings variables (Xt21, Xt, and
Xt3) are highly correlated, as are the future cumulative returns and future earnings variables
(Rt3 and Xt3). The correlation coefficients among the control variables are low or modest,
Table 1. Sample description
Panel A. Yearly Distribution
Year # of firm years % of total
1995 825 6.76
1996 788 6.45
1997 832 6.81
1998 901 7.38
1999 923 7.56
2000 983 8.05
2001 993 8.13
2002 978 8.01
2003 976 7.99
2004 999 8.18
2005 978 8.01
2006 1066 8.73
2007 971 7.95
Total 12,213 100.00
Panel B. Industry Distribution
Two-digit SIC Industry title # of firm years % of total
01–09 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 19 0.16
10–14 Mining 604 4.95
15–17 Construction 146 1.20
20–34, 37–39 Manufacturing except for machinery and equipment 4880 39.96
35–36 Industrial machinery and equipment 2153 17.63
40–49 Transportation, communications, and utilities 659 5.40
50–51 Wholesale trade 507 4.15
52–59 Retail trade 1268 10.38
70–89 Service 1933 15.83
91–99 Public administration and others 44 0.36
Total 12,213 100.00
Notes: This table describes the sample used in the empirical analysis. The sample consists of ExecuComp firms,
excluding those in the financial industry during the 1995–2007 period. Note that because a FERC analysis requires a firm
to have return and earnings data for the next three years, we use the data up to 2010. Panel A presents the sample
distribution by year. Panel B displays the distribution by industry.
3In particular, the mean and median of PMDTA are similar in magnitude to those reported in previous studies such as
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) and Kothari et al. (2005).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics (N ¼ 12,213)
Variable Mean STD P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95
EQ_COMPt 0.4155 0.2925 0.0000 0.1478 0.4421 0.6519 0.8700
RETt 0.1669 0.4545 20.4526 20.1216 0.1103 0.3717 0.9821
Xt21 0.0334 0.0690 20.0716 0.0237 0.0445 0.0631 0.1008
Xt 0.0404 0.0669 20.0742 0.0262 0.0505 0.0715 0.1163
Xt3 0.1435 0.2393 20.2728 0.0564 0.1559 0.2512 0.4865
RETt3 0.2693 0.7902 20.6904 20.2591 0.1148 0.5898 1.7889
SIZEt 7.3656 1.5462 5.1151 6.2449 7.1646 8.3282 10.2626
LOSSt 0.1730 0.3783 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
GROWTHt 0.3130 0.5253 20.2172 0.0196 0.1809 0.4345 1.3543
STD_EARNt 0.0514 0.0758 0.0055 0.0128 0.0246 0.0535 0.2034
ACt 1.9959 0.7626 0.6931 1.6094 2.0794 2.5649 3.0910
NUM_MFt 2.9374 4.0331 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5.0000 11.0000
PMDTAt 20.0240 0.1025 20.1615 20.0697 20.0237 0.0187 0.1119
Panel B. Correlation matrix: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
EQ_COMPt 1 20.0124 20.0620 20.0961 20.0852 20.0322 0.2697 0.0483 0.0833 0.0032 0.3052 0.1259 20.0576
RETt 2 20.0345 20.0095 0.2687 0.2914 20.0711 20.1003 20.1514 0.3036 20.1605 0.0242 20.0651 20.0277
Xt21 3 20.1375 0.0875 0.4540 0.2285 0.0253 0.1138 20.2215 0.0660 20.1583 0.0580 0.0755 20.0809
Xt 4 20.1642 0.3860 0.5197 0.4018 0.0167 0.0782 20.3212 0.1727 20.2847 0.0504 0.0509 0.0148
Xt3 5 20.1162 0.4047 0.2885 0.4633 0.4252 0.0336 20.6891 0.1283 20.5449 0.0569 0.0303 20.0534
RETt3 6 20.0369 20.0484 0.0901 0.0651 0.5203 20.0493 20.2887 20.0275 20.1976 20.0129 20.0213 20.0350
SIZEt 7 0.2743 20.0556 20.0057 20.0213 20.0039 20.0020 20.1585 20.0258 20.1776 0.6881 0.2358 20.1159
LOSSt 8 0.0505 20.1975 20.1861 20.2736 20.6552 20.3714 20.1581 20.0661 0.6109 20.1122 20.0720 0.0896
GROWTHt 9 0.0536 0.2952 0.0222 0.2255 0.2238 20.0058 0.0074 20.1697 20.0996 0.1139 20.0382 20.0317
STD_EARNt 10 20.0208 20.1859 20.0506 20.1399 20.4119 20.2626 20.2862 0.5405 20.1964 20.1189 20.0671 0.0642
ACt 11 0.3090 0.0318 20.0846 20.0559 0.0195 0.0064 0.7223 20.1073 0.1349 20.1938 0.2349 20.1196
NUM_MFt 12 0.1522 20.0963 0.0380 20.0217 20.0147 20.0049 0.2368 20.0529 20.0451 20.1198 0.2372 20.0751
PMDTAt 13 20.0787 20.0560 20.0046 0.0397 20.0461 20.0532 20.1202 0.0992 20.0511 0.1537 20.1168 20.1005
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% levels. Panel B displays the correlations among the variables. The correlation coefficients at the 5% significance level are presented in boldface.
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except those for analyst coverage and firm size (0.6881) and the loss and volatility of earnings
(0.6109).
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Overall Effect of Stock-Based Compensation on the FERC: Test of H1
To test H1, we estimate the OLS regression expressed in equation (2). The results are presented
in Table 3. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm
and year clustering to address any potential correlations across observations (within the same
firm or year). In Panel A of Table 3, which is based on the percentile rank variable of stock-
based compensation, the coefficient of the interaction term, Xt3×EQ_COMPt, is positive and
significant at the 10% level. This result supports the alternative hypothesis, H1a, suggesting
that stock-based compensation, on average, improves the informativeness of stock prices in
relation to future earnings.
Consistent with previous studies of the FERC (e.g. Ayers & Freeman, 2003; Choi et al.,
2011; Lundholm & Myers, 2002), we find that both of the coefficients of Xt (ERC) and Xt3
(FERC) are significantly positive at the 1% level. In addition, the results for the control vari-
ables are largely consistent with those found in the literature. The FERC is found to be lower
Table 3. Stock-based compensation and FERC
Panel A: Using the percentile rank variable of Stock-based Compensation
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.4235
∗∗ .041
Xt 1.0766
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.1712
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1460
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0004
∗ .085
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.0072∗∗∗ .000
Xt×EQ_COMPt 0.0032∗∗ .040
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0020∗ .070
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0001 .592
SIZEt 20.0405
∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0016 .946
LOSSt 0.0160 .570
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6930∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1735
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1968∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7625
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0240 .958
ACt 0.0593
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×ACt 20.0096 .768
NUM_MFt 20.0091
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0168∗∗∗ .009
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .3657
(Continued)
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for loss-making firms (LOSS) and higher for firms with a higher management forecast fre-
quency (NUM_MF).4
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression based on the continuous variable
of stock-based compensation. Similar to the results displayed in Panel A, the coefficient on the
interaction between future earnings and stock-based compensation is significantly positive. Our
results indicate that stock-based compensation improves the market’s ability to anticipate future
firm performance, thereby making stock prices incorporate more information about future earn-
ings. Moreover, these results suggest that the informative disclosure incentive, on average, out-
weighs the earnings management motivation as the proportion of equity-based pay in CEO total
compensation increases.
Table 3. Continued
Panel B: Using the continuous variable of stock-based Compensation
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.5042
∗∗ .014
Xt 1.0988
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.1924
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1469
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0348
∗ .086
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.6939∗∗∗ .000
Xt×EQ_COMPt 0.3343∗∗ .028
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.1940∗ .085
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0157 .562
SIZEt 20.0405
∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0015 .950
LOSSt 0.0159 .573
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6918∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1736
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1967∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7616
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0240 .957
ACt 0.0595
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×ACt 20.0096 .767
NUM_MFt 20.0091
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0168∗∗∗ .009
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .3656
Notes: This table reports the results from the OLS regression analysis in terms of the effect of stock-based compensation
on the FERC. Panel A displays the results using the percentile rank variable of stock-based compensation. Panel B
presents the results using the continuous variable of stock-based compensation. See Appendix 1 for the variable
definitions. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and
are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
4Because the coefficients on Xt3×GROWTH are negative, which is inconsistent with our expectation, we conduct a test
using the market-to-book ratio (MTB) as an alternative proxy for growth. The coefficient on Xt3×MTB is positive and
significant, as expected, while our main findings are qualitatively unchanged (untabulated).
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4.2. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Effect of Stock-Based Compensation on the FERC: Test
of H2
H2 predicts that stock-based compensation has a weaker effect for firms with a higher level of
earnings management than other firms. To test this cross-sectional variation in the effect of
stock-based compensation on the FERC, we estimate regression model (3).
Table 4 presents the H2 test results using the percentile rank variable and the continuous vari-
able of EQ_COMPt in Panels A and B, respectively. For both variables, we find that the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term, Xt3×EQ_COMPt, is positive and significant at the 5% level, which
is consistent with the results in Table 3. This interaction term is significantly negative for the
highest group of earnings management, as indicated by the coefficients on Xt3×EQ_COMPt×
HIGH_EMt in Panels A and B (p-values ¼ .014 and 0.015, respectively). This result supports
the opportunistic manipulation argument. That is, stock-based compensation has a less pro-
nounced effect on the FERC when managers engage in more aggressive earnings management
than in other cases. In addition, according to the F-test result, the total effect of equity-based
compensation on the group of firms with a high level of earnings management (i.e. the sum
Table 4. Stock-based compensation and FERC: effect of earnings management
Panel A: Using the percentile rank variable of stock-based
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.4377
∗∗ .030
Xt 1.0929
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.1656
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1457
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0003 .133
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.0071∗∗∗ .000
Xt×EQ_COMPt 0.0029∗ .063
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0029∗∗ .024
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0002 .544
SIZEt 20.0412
∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0026 .909
LOSSt 0.0170 .545
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6683∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1749
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1944∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7297
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0151 .973
ACt 0.0592
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×ACt 20.0105 .747
NUM_MFt 20.0092
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0167∗∗∗ .008
HIGH_EMt 20.0230
∗ .093
Xt3×HIGH_EMt 0.0155 .829
Xt3×EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt 20.0024∗∗ .014
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
F-test
Xt3×EQ_COMPt + Xt3×EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt¼ 0 0.0005 .652
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .3675
(Continued)
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of the coefficients on Xt3×EQ_COMP t and Xt3×EQ_COMP t×HIGH_EM t) is not significantly
different from zero, implying that additional stock compensation would not improve firms’
information environments.5
Table 4. Continued
Panel B: Using the continuous variable of stock-based Compensation
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.5173
∗∗ .010
Xt 1.1115
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.1967
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1469
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.03101 .133
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.6830∗∗∗ .000
Xt ×EQ_COMPt 0.3089∗∗ .042
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.2726∗∗ .031
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0178 .520
SIZEt 20.0412
∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0026 .910
LOSSt 0.0169 .548
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6672∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1749
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1943∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7290
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0158 .971
ACt 0.0593
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×ACt 20.0105 .746
NUM_MFt 20.0092
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0167∗∗∗ .008
HIGH_EMt 20.0230
∗ .093
Xt3×HIGH_EMt 20.0108 .867
Xt3×EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt 20.2223∗∗ .015
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
F-test
Xt3×EQ_COMPt + Xt3×EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt¼ 0 0.0503 .657
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .3674
Notes: This table reports the results from the cross-sectional analysis in terms of the effect of stock-based compensation
on the FERC, conditional on the magnitude of earnings management. Panel A displays the results using the percentile
rank variable of stock-based compensation. Panel B presents the results using the continuous variable of stock-based
compensation. HIGH_EM is an indicator variable representing the highest quintile group of performance-matched
discretionary total accruals. See Appendix 1 for the other variable definitions. All of the continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm
and year clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
5We repeat the tests in Table 4 using the absolute discretionary accrual measure instead of our signed discretionary
accrual measure. The coefficient for the highest earnings management group is still negative but is not significant
when the absolute measure is employed. This result, together with that from the analysis in Section 5.3, indicates that
the reported negative impact of EM on the FERC is mainly driven by managers who engage in temporary income-boost-
ing for their future selling activities.
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4.3. Robustness Tests
While the following section discusses how we address endogeneity issues regarding stock-based
compensation, we provide a brief summary of the results obtained from several untabulated
robustness tests. First, because the coverage of management forecasts in the First Call database
is limited in the early 1990s and becomes more comprehensive starting in 1998 (see e.g. Chuck,
Matsumoto, & Miller, 2013), regression models (2) and (3) are re-estimated after excluding
observations before 1998. We find that the results basically echo those obtained from the
whole sample, indicating that our findings are not adversely affected by the incomplete coverage
of the First Call database.
Second, we examine the effect of the revised FAS123 (FAS123R) on our main results. Effec-
tive beginning in 2005, FAS123R requires firms to expense stock-based compensation at its fair
value instead of intrinsic value. While this new accounting standard has been considered to elim-
inate certain benefits of accounting treatment for granting stock options, it is not clear how the
new change affects the positive effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC. Based on a test
comparing the pre-adoption period and the post-adoption period of FAS123R, we find that stock-
based compensation remains positively associated with the FERC even in the post-adoption
period, although its effect is weaker than that in the pre-adoption period.6
Third, we examine whether the positive effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC is
observed for near-term earnings, long-term future earnings, or both. Because managers’ incen-
tive to manipulate earnings induced by stock-based compensation is likely to be temporary, for
example, only prior to insider sales, the positive effect of stock-based compensation on the
FERC should be stronger for the long-term component than for the short-term component of
future earnings, consistent with the informative disclosure argument.7 We confirm this conjec-
ture by finding that stock-based compensation actually improves the FERC for long-term earn-
ings (i.e. two-year and three-year ahead earnings) but not for short-term earnings (i.e. current and
one-year forward earnings).
5. Additional Analyses
5.1. Controlling for the Endogeneity of Stock-Based Compensation
Similar to previous studies on executive compensation, our study is subject to the potential endo-
geneity of stock-based compensation. In particular, according to the traditional compensation
literature, the principal is likely to put more weight on a performance measure that can better
capture the agent’s efforts. If stock prices better represent managerial efforts to improve
future earnings, it is expected that firms with more informative stock prices are more likely to
compensate their managers with equity. Kang and Liu (2008) find that pay-to-performance sen-
sitivity increases when a stock price aggregates more information (either private or public)
because a more informative stock price enables more effective monitoring to improve
6We posit that this weaker effect for the post-adoption period could be due to the small sample size in the post-adoption
period. In addition, the post-adoption period overlaps with the economic downturn of the financial crisis, during which
stock prices and earnings were very volatile. The high volatility associated with these great uncertainties may not have
been fully anticipated by managers in 2007, for which the current stock return data are collected. While it would be inter-
esting to further examine the implications of the new accounting standard related to stock-based compensation on man-
agers’ disclosure behaviors, we propose that such an examination be conducted in a future study due to the sample
limitation and scope of the present study. Further implications are discussed in the conclusion.
7We appreciate the referee’s suggestion to conduct this analysis to strengthen our inferences.
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managerial incentives. Jayaraman and Milbourn (2011) similarly demonstrate that the pro-
portion of stock-based compensation in total compensation increases with a firm’s stock
liquidity.
To address the potential endogeneity between managerial compensation and the informative-
ness of stock prices, we re-estimate regressions (2) and (3) using a two-stage regression analysis.
The predicted level of stock-based compensation in year t is calculated based on the model of
stock-based compensation used by Dikolli, Kulp, and Sedatole (2009). To the extent that
some of the instrumental variables used in the first-stage estimation model are not directly
associated with the FERC of the current year, we can mitigate the potential endogeneity of
stock-based compensation. We estimate the model as follows:
EQ COMPt = c0 + c1 × Qt−1 + c2 × ROAt−1 + c3 × CFOt−1 + c4 × RETt + c5 × RETt−1
+ c6 × STD ROAt−1 + c7 × STD CFOt−1 + c8 × RET VOLt−1
+ c9 × LOG(SALES)t−1 + c10 × NOLt−1 + c11 × SF CASHt−1
+ c12 × CONSTR DIVt−1 + Industry Dummies+ Year Dummies+ zt,
(4)
where Qt21 is the Tobin’s Q ratio at the end of year t21, CFOt21 is the cash flow from oper-
ations for year t21, ROAt21 is the return on assets for year t21, STD_ROAt21
(STD_CFOt21) is the standard deviation of ROA (CFO) from years t25 to t21,
RET_VOLt21 is the standard deviation of annual stock returns from years t–5 to t21, and
LOG(SALES)t21 is the natural logarithm of sales for year t21. NOLt21 is an indicator variable
representing the net operating loss carried forward from year t21. SF_CASHt21 is a variable
representing the cash shortfall for year t21. CONSTR_DIVt21 is an indicator variable for the
dividend constraint for year t21. The exact definitions of these variables are provided in Appen-
dix 1. While previous studies identify these explanatory variables, particularly NOLt21,
SF_CASHt21, and CONSTR_DIVt21, as determinants of stock-based compensation, researchers
have not established whether these three variables are systematically associated with the FERC.
Appendix 2 displays the results of the estimation of regression (4). As indicated in the table,
the variables, such as Qt21, STD_ROAt21, RET_VOLt21, LOG(SALES)t21, NOLt21,
SF_CASHt21,and CONSTR_DIVt21, have significant coefficients with the expected signs.
This finding is consistent with those of previous studies (e.g. Dikolli et al., 2009). Given that
we are interested in the effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC, not solely its effect
on the dependent variable (i.e. current stock return) in the second-stage regression, we cannot
directly evaluate the validity of the three instrumental variables (NOLt21, SF_CASHt21, and
CONSTR_DIVt21) based on Stock-Yogo statistics. Instead, we test the validity of these instru-
mental variables following the suggestions of Larcker and Rusticus (2010). The F-test for the
joint explanatory power of the three instruments is 28.86, which is above the suggested value
for three instruments of 12.83, thus representing a low possibility of weak instrument problems.
In addition, the three instruments collectively improve the explanatory power of the regression
model of stock-based compensation by 1.0 percentage point, that is, from 12.2% to 13.2%.8
8In addition, we test whether the three instruments are associated with the FERC by estimating the FERC model augmen-
ted with these three variables and their interaction terms with future earnings. The untabulated results depict that all of the
coefficients on the interaction terms (between the three instrumental variables and future earnings) are not significant,
indicating that these variables are not associated with the FERC. This result provides additional evidence for the validity
of our instruments.
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The results of the second-stage regressions using the predicted value of stock-based compen-
sation are presented in Panel A of Table 5. In accordance with our hypothesis, both Columns (1)
and (2) demonstrate that the coefficient on the interaction term between Xt3 and EQ_COMPt
remains positive. The coefficient is marginally insignificant (p-value ¼ .143) in Column (1)
but is statistically significant at the 5% level in Column (2) (p-value ¼ .050). The earnings man-
agement results provide inferences that are similar to those displayed in the previous section.
Column (2) indicates that the coefficient on Xt3× EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt is significantly
negative (p-value ¼ .018).9
To further alleviate the endogeneity concern, we conduct a change analysis by considering
two events of granting stock-based compensation during our sample period: (i) the initiation
of equity-based compensation and (ii) a substantial increase in such payments. If the enhanced
informativeness of stock prices is a result of changes in equity-based compensation schemes
rather than other causes, we expect to observe a higher FERC in the periods after such
changes. First, to isolate the initiation cases, we identify those firms that started equity-based
compensation schemes over our research period. Then, we set three years after the event, includ-
ing the year of initiation, as the post-period and three years before the event year as the pre-
period. Second, we also identify the group of firms that experienced a substantial increase in
equity-based compensation based on an annual change in EQ_COMP. Specifically, those
firm-years that belong to the top quintile of annual change in EQ_COMP are defined as the
group with a high increase. Again, the three-year period after the change (inclusive of the
event year) is classified as the post-period and is compared with the three-year period before
the change.10 The dummy variable Post is set to one for the post-period and zero for the pre-
period.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of the change analysis. As shown in Columns (1) and (2),
the coefficient on the interaction variable, Xt3×POST, is positive and significant at the 5% level
for both the initiation and high increase cases. This enhanced FERC for the post-period suggests
that our results are not likely to be driven by inverse causality or by uncontrolled firm charac-
teristics that may affect both the FERC and a firm’s choice of CEO remuneration package.
As a further check, we repeat the tests by changing the event period from three years to one
year. The untabulated results are similar to those in Panel B of Table 5, indicating an improved
FERC after firms initiate stock-based compensation or experience a significant increase in such
payments.
5.2. Effect of Management Forecast Frequency
In an additional analysis, we examine a specific channel through which stock-based compen-
sation can affect the informativeness of current stock prices in relation to future earnings.
Equity-incentivized CEOs can use management forecasts to communicate their private infor-
mation about future earnings to shareholders (Nagar et al., 2003). Trueman (1986) argues that
the release of a forecast itself can affect firm value. A manager who detects any changes in a
firm’s economic environment is expected to make optimal business decisions based on the
9Alternatively, we also employ the lagged variable of stock-based compensation as an explanatory variable. To the extent
that stock-based compensation from the previous year is based on determinants that are available only before the current
year, the previous year’s stock-based compensation is more likely to be exogenous to the factors that potentially affect the
FERC in the current year. The inferences from the test using the lagged variable of stock-based compensation are similar
to those from the main analyses (untabulated).
10To obtain a meaningful inference, for both events, we only consider cases in which a firm has at least two observations
in both the pre- and post-periods.
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Table 5. Stock-based compensation and FERC: controlling for endogeneity of stock-based compensation
Panel A: Using the predicted variable of stock-based compensation
Test of H1 (1) Test of H2 (2)
Variables Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.5036
∗∗ .017 20.5098∗∗ .014
Xt 1.0428
∗∗∗ .000 1.0541∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.2111
∗∗∗ .000 1.2198∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1427
∗∗∗ .000 20.1421∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0003 .110 0.0002 .178
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.0066∗∗∗ .000 20.0066∗∗∗ .000
Xt×EQ_COMPt 0.0052∗∗ .035 0.0050∗∗ .047
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0016 .143 0.0025∗∗ .050
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0002 .501 20.0002 .450
SIZEt 20.0378
∗∗∗ .004 20.0382∗∗∗ .003
Xt3× SIZEt 0.0001 .995 20.0019 .943
LOSSt 0.0194 .456 0.0201 .436
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6894∗∗∗ .000 21.6612∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1669
∗∗∗ .000 0.1677∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.2086∗∗∗ .000 20.2049∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7306
∗∗∗ .000 20.6939∗∗∗ .000
Xt3× STD_EARNt 20.0028 .995 0.0046 .992
ACt 0.0593
∗∗∗ .002 0.0593∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×ACt 20.0288 .414 20.0298 .401
NUM_MFt 20.0088
∗∗∗ .001 20.0089∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0169∗∗ .011 0.0169∗∗∗ .008
HIGH_EMt 20.0151 .283
Xt3×HIGH_EMt 20.0091 .903
Xt3×EQ_COMPt21×HIGH_EMt 20.0023∗∗ .018
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
F-test:
Xt3×EQ_COMPt +
Xt3×EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt¼ 0
0.0002 .860
N 11,415 11,415
Adj. R2 .3686 .3704
Panel B: Initiation and increase of stock-based compensation
Initiation (1) Increase (2)
Variables Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.8341
∗∗∗ .007 21.2285∗∗∗ .000
Xt 1.3581
∗∗∗ .001 1.4611∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.3498
∗∗∗ .008 1.8140∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1626
∗∗∗ .000 20.1738∗∗∗ .000
POST 0.038 .271 20.0244 .254
Xt21×POST 0.0099 .977 0.8099∗∗∗ .001
Xt×POST 20.6457 .140 20.5909∗∗ .014
Xt3×POST 0.2683∗∗ .029 0.1920∗∗ .042
RETt3×POST 20.0391 .390 20.0713∗∗ .025
SIZEt 20.0349 .179 20.0456
∗∗ .014
(Continued)
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new situation. Investors consider this factor when evaluating a firm; thus, their perceptions of the
firm manager’s capabilities become value relevant. However, as investors cannot directly
observe a CEO’s skills, an equity-incentivized manager with a high level of ability attempts
to signal that she has noticed such changes by voluntarily providing management forecasts.
Based on Trueman’s (1986) model, Baik et al. (2011) report empirical findings that management
forecast frequency is positively associated with CEO ability. They also confirm that more useful
information is transmitted to the market by CEOs with a high level of ability than by CEOs with
a low level of ability, as forecasts issued by the former are more accurate and impactful than
those issued by the latter. Choi et al. (2011) further find that more frequent management earnings
forecasts increase stock prices’ informativeness about future earnings. In line with these studies,
we conjecture that the association between stock-based compensation and the FERC is lower for
firms that provide less frequent management forecasts than for firms that provide more frequent
management forecasts.
To test this association, we include an additional variable, LOW_MFt, and its interaction
term with the earnings and return variables in equation (2). LOW_MFt is defined as a
dummy variable for the lowest frequency group of management forecasts. It takes the
value of one if a firm belongs to the lowest quintile group for the number of management
forecasts made in year t.
Panel A: Using the predicted variable of stock-based compensation
Test of H1 (1) Test of H2 (2)
Variables Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0523 .574 20.0744 .199
LOSSt 0.1041 .200 20.0265 .349
Xt3×LOSSt 21.3160∗∗ .037 22.0919∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.2308
∗∗∗ .000 0.1152∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.4976∗∗∗ .000 20.3446∗∗∗ .003
STD_EARNt 20.5845 .307 20.4914 .188
Xt3×STD_EARNt 21.3887 .441 0.3189 .772
ACt 20.0088 .843 0.0761
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×ACt 0.2722∗ .093 0.0458 .571
NUM_MFt 20.0099
∗ .065 20.0078∗∗ .034
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0282 .274 0.0186∗ .067
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
N 1104 4337
Adj. R2 .3752 .3889
Notes: This table presents additional tests to control for the potential endogeneity of stock-based compensation. Panel A
shows the results based on the predicted variable of stock-based compensation for year t, estimated from the model in
Appendix 2. H1 is addressed in Column 1 and H2 in Column 2. Panel B reports the results for firms that initiate the equity
based-compensation or experience a substantial increase in such payments. The OLS regression analysis is conducted.
The top quintile group of the annual change in EQ_COMP is selected as firms with high increases in equity-based
payments. The three-year period after the event (inclusive of the event year) is classified as a post-period (POST) and
compared with a three-year period before the event. See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. All of the continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors
adjusted for firm and year clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
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The results are presented in Table 6. The coefficient on the interaction term Xt3×EQ_COMPt
is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the results shown in Table 3.
This interaction term is significantly negative for the lowest group of management forecast fre-
quency, as exhibited by the coefficient on Xt3×EQ_COMPt×LOW_MFt (p-value ¼ .001). The
total effect of stock-based compensation for firms with a low forecast frequency (i.e. Xt3×
EQ_COMPt + Xt3×EQ_COMPt×LOW_MFt) is insignificant according to the F-test result
(p-value ¼ .556). In other words, additional equity-based compensation in such firms does
not improve shareholders’ ability to predict future performance. A low level of forecast fre-
quency may indicate a CEO’s lower ability to precisely predict future earnings. In this case,
stock price informativeness about future earnings does not increase, as less accurate information
about future firm value is conveyed to the market through corporate disclosures. In our analysis,
improvement in the price informativeness associated with equity-based incentives is only
Table 6. Effect of management forecast frequency
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.4096
∗∗ .043
Xt 1.0889
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.1125
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1451
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0003
∗ .092
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.0073∗∗∗ .000
Xt ×EQ_COMPt 0.0027∗ .085
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0033∗∗∗ .002
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0002 .490
SIZEt 20.0426
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×SIZEt 0.0044 .852
LOSSt 0.0176 .535
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6856∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1725
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1965∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7547
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0361 .937
ACt 0.0633
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×ACt 20.0088 .793
NUM_MFt 20.0055
∗ .062
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0103 .203
LOW_MFt 0.0556
∗∗ .012
Xt3×LOW_MFt 0.1092 .175
Xt3×EQ_COMPt21×LOW_MFt 20.0041∗∗∗ .001
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
F-test
Xt3×EQ_COMPt + Xt3×EQ_COMPt×LOW_MFt¼ 0 20.0008 .556
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .3676
Notes: This table reports the results from the cross-sectional analysis of the effect of stock-based compensation on the
FERC, conditional on management forecast frequency. LOW_MF is an indicator variable for the lowest quintile group of
management forecast frequency. See Appendix 1 for other variable definitions. The continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year
clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
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observed in firms with a moderate or relatively high forecast frequency (i.e. firms not belonging
to the low forecast frequency group). This result is in line with Nagar et al.’s (2003) notion that
managers who receive a high level of stock-based compensation can alleviate disclosure agency
problems by making disclosures more frequently. Managers in the low forecast frequency group
may not be sufficiently motivated to frequently update investors’ earnings expectations due to
high levels of uncertainty about future earnings or high proprietary costs.
5.3. Future Net Sales by a CEO
As discussed in H2, the presence of earnings management may capture two incentives of man-
agers: one to distort earnings to maximize their remuneration and the other to communicate their
private information to shareholders. In the latter case, the FERC will be increased rather than
harmed by equity-incentivized managers, which may weaken the results from earnings manage-
ment in our main tests. In this section, we identify a subset of firms where the former incentive of
managers is more likely to dominate.11 Prior studies suggest that when managers with a high
level of equity-based incentives plan to sell their shares in the near future, they tend to
engage in earnings management by meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and reporting high dis-
cretionary accruals (e.g. Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Cheng et al.,
2011). Based on these studies, we identify two opposing cases of firms within the group of high
earnings management based on the level of net sales by the CEO in the subsequent year as
follows: one group with a high level (H_NET_SALES) and the other with a low level of
future net sales (L_NET_SALES). The former (latter) group includes firms within the top
(bottom) quintile of the high earnings management group. Net sales are calculated in dollar
amounts as open market sales minus open market purchases minus any options exercised and
then divided by the CEO’s total shareholdings.
The results are shown in Table 7. The coefficient on H_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt is sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that the negative effect of high levels of earnings management on
price informativeness is mainly observed for firms with high future net sales. In addition, the
positive coefficient on L_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt suggests that in firms that have a high
level of earnings management, if the level of future net sales is low, rewarding the manager
based on equity value still improves the FERC. This result, together with those for the other
groups (Xt3×EQ_COMPt), supports our overall findings that stock-based compensation, on
average, improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings.12
5.4. Alternative Measure of the Information Environment
In this section, we test our hypotheses by conducting an alternative analysis based on a measure
of a firm’s information environment. While the FERC measure is mainly intended to capture the
informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, it is possible to expect that managerial dis-
closures induced by a higher amount of stock-based compensation can make a firm’s overall
information environment more transparent.13 Thus, we examine an index of firm opacity
11We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this argument and the test.
12We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use an alternative measure of net sales that uses the market value of equity
as the deflator instead of total shareholdings, following Cheng and Warfield (2005).
13Holding other factors constant, the FERC is likely to be positively associated with the transparency of a firm’s infor-
mation environment because many determinants of the FERC (such as analysts following, institutional trading, and cor-
porate disclosures) relate to information flows in the market. However, individual factors may not capture the overall
transparency due to the existence of private information and other external market factors. The opacity measure
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developed by Anderson et al. (2009). They combine four commonly used proxies for infor-
mation opacity and develop an index as the sum of the decile ranks divided by 40. The four
proxies are (i) trading volume (inverse ranking), (ii) the bid-ask spread, (iii) the number of ana-
lysts following (inverse ranking), and (iv) the analyst forecast error. The first measure, trading
volume, is a proxy for information uncertainty and asymmetry (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Lo,
Mamaysky, & Wang, 2004), while the bid-ask spread captures the information asymmetry
Table 7. Earnings management and future net sales
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Xt21 20.4147
∗∗ .042
Xt 1.0719
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3 1.2023
∗∗∗ .000
RETt3 20.1454
∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 0.0004
∗ .089
Xt21×EQ_COMPt 20.0073∗∗∗ .000
Xt×EQ_COMPt 0.0031∗∗ .037
Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0022∗ .061
RETt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0002 .562
SIZEt 20.0396
∗∗∗ .003
Xt3×SIZEt 20.0066 .780
LOSSt 0.0167 .559
Xt3×LOSSt 21.6806∗∗∗ .000
GROWTHt 0.1722
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×GROWTHt 20.1971∗∗∗ .000
STD_EARNt 20.7513
∗∗∗ .000
Xt3×STD_EARNt 20.0501 .912
ACt 0.0574
∗∗∗ .002
Xt3×ACt 20.0021 .947
NUM_MFt 20.0090
∗∗∗ .001
Xt3×NUM_MFt 0.0158∗∗ .015
H_Net_Sales 0.0669∗∗∗ .003
L_Net_Sales 20.0181 .473
H_Net_Sales×Xt3 0.0132 .895
L_Net_Sales×Xt3 20.2825∗∗∗ .004
H_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0031∗∗ .029
L_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt 0.0031∗ .062
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
F-test:
H_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt¼L_Net_Sales×Xt3×EQ_COMPt 20.0062 .013
N 12,213
Adj. R2 .367
Notes: This table reports the effect of stock-based compensation on the FERC, conditional on the magnitude of earnings
management. H_NET_SALES (L_NET_SALES) is set to one if a CEO’s net sales in year t + 1 are in the top (bottom)
quintile among the high earnings management group. See Appendix 1 for the other variable definitions. All of the
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
developed by Anderson et al. (2009) provides a composite index of the transparency of a firm’s information environment
by combining four commonly used proxies for information uncertainty and asymmetry.
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among investors (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Anderson et al. (2009) further explain that the
number of analysts following represents the intensity of market scrutiny and that analyst forecast
errors capture the availability of information about the firm (Barry & Brown, 1985; Botosan,
Plumlee, & Xie, 2004). To the extent that more disclosures by equity-incentivized managers
help to improve the transparency of the information environment, we expect to observe a nega-
tive effect of stock-based compensation on firm opacity. We specifically estimate the following
OLS regressions:
OPACITYt = d0 + d1 × LOG(ASSETS)t + d2 × RET VOLt + d3 × ROAt−1
+ d4 × FIRM AGEt + d5 × R&Dt + d6 × LEVERAGEt + d7 × EQ COMPt
+ Industry Dummies+ Year Dummies+ ht,
(5)
OPACITYt = d0 + d1 × LOG(ASSETS)t + d2 × RET VOLt + d3 × ROAt−1
+ d4 × FIRM AGEt + d5 × R&Dt + d6 × LEVERAGEt + d7 × EQ COMPt
+ d8 × EQ COMPt × HIGH EMt(or EQ COMPt × LOW MFt)
+ Industry Dummies+ Year Dummies+ ht,
(6)
Table 8. Stock-based compensation and firm opacity
Main analysis (1)
Earnings management
(2)
Management forecasts
(3)
Variables Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value Coefficient p-Value
LOG(ASSETS)t 20.0679
∗∗∗ .000 20.0676∗∗∗ .000 20.0673∗∗∗ .000
RET_VOLt 0.0027
∗∗∗ .000 0.0027∗∗∗ .000 0.0026∗∗∗ .000
ROAt21 20.3216
∗∗∗ .000 20.3168∗∗∗ .000 20.3145∗∗∗ .000
FIRM_AGEt 0.0416
∗∗∗ .000 0.0414∗∗∗ .000 0.0408∗∗∗ .000
R&Dt 20.3482
∗∗∗ .000 20.3455∗∗∗ .000 20.3491∗∗∗ .000
LEVERAGEt 0.1837
∗∗∗ .000 0.1826∗∗∗ .000 0.1828∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt 20.0024
∗∗∗ .000 20.0024∗∗∗ .000 20.0025∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt ×HIGH_EMt 0.0001∗∗ .047
EQ_COMPt ×LOW_MFt 0.0005∗∗∗ .000
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included
F-test
EQ_COMPt +
EQ_COMPt21×HIGH_EMt¼ 0
20.0023∗∗∗ .000
EQ_COMPt +
EQ_COMPt21×LOW_MFt¼ 0
20.0020∗∗∗ .000
N 14,850 14,850 14,850
Adj. R2 .5702 .5704 .5732
Notes: This table reports the results from the OLS regression analysis in terms of the effect of stock-based compensation
on firm opacity. Column 1 displays the main analysis results. Columns 2 and 3 present the results from the cross-sectional
analyses, conditional on the magnitude of earnings management (Column 2) and management forecast frequency
(Column 3). See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. The continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
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where OPACITYt is a variable representing the opacity of the firm’s information environment
for year t, standardized to a range from 0 to 1; LOG(ASSETS)t is the natural logarithm of
total assets at the end of year t; FIRM_AGEt is the number of years a firm has been listed on
COMPUSTAT as of the end of year t; R&Dt is the research and development expenses
(divided by total assets) for year t; and LEVERAGEt is the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets at the end of year t.14
Table 8 displays the results of the regression estimations. Column (1) indicates that the coef-
ficient of the main variable of interest, EQ_COMPt, is negative and statistically significant
(p-value , .001), indicating that a firm’s information environment is less opaque (i.e. more
transparent) when the firm gives its CEO more stock-based compensation. This result basically
echoes those obtained from the previous tests in terms of the FERC. In addition, the inferences
made in the cross-sectional analyses displayed in Columns (2) and (3) are similar to those indi-
cated in the previous sections as well. The coefficient of EQ_COMPt×HIGH_EMt is signifi-
cantly positive (p-value ¼ .047) in Column (2), and the coefficient of
EQ_COMPt×LOW_MFt is also significantly positive (p-value , .001).
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the association between CEO stock-based compensation and the market’s
ability to anticipate future earnings using a sample of S&P 1500 firms during the 1995–2007
period. We find a positive effect of CEO stock-based compensation on the FERC. This result
implies that stock prices are more reflective of future earnings as the proportion of equity-
based pay in CEO total compensation increases. In addition, this positive relationship is
weakened for firms with a high level of discretionary accruals or a low management forecast
frequency. These results remain robust to different stock-based compensation measures (i.e. per-
centile rank and continuous variables) and in various additional tests. Possible endogeneity
issues are addressed through a two-stage analysis and a change analysis.
Although we conduct various tests to check the sensitivity of our main findings, we acknowl-
edge the following limitations of this study. First, we do not test situations in which equity-com-
pensated managers are likely to temporarily depress their firms’ stock prices before the option
award date (Baker et al., 2003, 2009; McAnally et al., 2008). Whereas these studies examine
stock prices before the stock grant date on a quarterly basis or over an even shorter period,
the FERC model adopted in the current study focuses on one-year returns and, thus, likely neu-
tralizes such temporary changes to a stock price.15
Second, although we treat management forecasts as homogeneous, shareholders may perceive
the credibility of disclosures differently depending on who makes the disclosure. When estimat-
ing future stock prices, shareholders are more likely to rely on information from managers who
have a history of accurate forecasts (Yang, 2012). Managers may intentionally choose to report
positive news forecasts more precisely than negative news forecasts before insider sales (Cheng,
Luo, & Yue, 2013). In our analysis, we consider only management forecast frequency as a con-
ditioning variable.16
Finally, despite various tests conducted to address the endogeneity concern, we cannot com-
pletely rule out the possibility of endogeneity. Certain unobservable firm characteristics may
14The other variables are as defined earlier, and their exact measurements are provided in Appendix A.
15Although stock movement has an effect, it should strengthen the results in the opposite direction of our main findings
(i.e. a negative association between stock-based compensation and the FERC).
16However, in testing for earnings management, we explore cases in which managers are more likely to engage in earn-
ings management (i.e. high insider sales in the following period).
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affect a firm’s tendency to provide stock-based compensation and its information environment
simultaneously. For example, high-growth firms tend to offer more stock options to their man-
agers. At the same time, the equity value of such firms is more closely related to reported earn-
ings, especially future earnings (see e.g. the valuation model by Zhang (2000)).17 It is
worthwhile to note that although we control for various firm characteristics, including firm
growth, and conduct alternative tests, these approaches may not completely resolve the endo-
geneity issue.
Despite these limitations, our study provides empirical evidence that offering stock-based pay
to managers improves the informativeness of stock prices in relation to future earnings. Of par-
ticular importance is this study’s confirmation of the role played by stock-based compensation in
mitigating disclosure-related agency costs. The enhanced information flow from managers can
benefit shareholders by reducing their information costs, such as collecting and processing the
information. In this sense, providing stock compensation will be particularly beneficial for share-
holders of companies with scarce information sources or high uncertainty in predicting future
earnings. Furthermore, when designing employee remuneration schemes, the additional costs
resulting from tying pay to firm equity value need to be carefully compared with the benefits.
This study suggests that the benefits in terms of shareholders’ improved ability to predict
future firm performance may partially offset the costs, such as a higher level of risk premium
demanded by a risk-averse manager when her pay is based on a risky stock rather than a cash
payment. Thus, our findings should be of interest to shareholders and boards of directors with
respect to their executive compensation policies.
Accounting policies on how to report employee compensation may also affect a firm’s prefer-
ence for providing equity-based compensation and the behaviors of equity-incentivized man-
agers. For example, the adoption of FAS123R is reported to result in significant decreases in
the usage of stock options (Hayes, Lemmon, & Qiu, 2012). However, only modest changes in
pay-to-performance sensitivity are found, as most firms have substituted stock options with
other forms of compensation, such as restricted stocks. A future study could investigate the
impact of the standard change on equity-incentivized managers’ disclosure behaviors and on
the market’s ability to predict future firm performance.
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Appendix 1. Variable Descriptions
Variables Description
EQ_COMPt Proportion of CEO’s compensation tied to her firm’s share price for year t, defined as the
sum of the stock option and restricted stock grant values, divided by the total
compensation
RETt Cumulative stock return for year t
RETt3 Cumulative stock return for years t + 1 through t + 3
Xt Earnings for year t, defined as the income available to common shareholders before
extraordinary items for year t, deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning
of year t
Xt21 Earnings for year t21
Xt3 Sum of earnings for years t + 1 through t + 3, measured as the income available to
common shareholders before extraordinary items for years t + 1 through t + 3,
deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t
SIZEt Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of year t
LOSSt Indicator variable for negative future earnings, set to one if Xt3 is negative and zero
otherwise
GROWTHt Growth of total assets in percentage from years t21 to t + 1
STD_EARNt Standard deviation of earnings (X ) from years t to t + 3
ACt Analyst coverage, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts
who follow a firm in the month before the earnings announcement for year t, where
the number of analysts is taken from the First Call Analyst Forecast database
NUM_MFt Number of management forecasts issued in year t, where the management forecast data
are taken from the First Call Company Issued Guidance files
LOW_MFt Indicator variable of the group of low frequency management forecasts, set to one if a
firm belongs to the lowest quintile group of the number of management forecasts in
year t
PMDTAt Performance matched discretionary total accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) for year t
HIGH_EMt Indicator variable of the group of firms with a high level of earnings management, set to
one if a firm belongs to the highest quintile group of the performance matched
discretionary total accruals in year t
Qt21 Tobin’s Q ratio at the end of year t21, defined as the market value divided by the book
value of assets
CFOt21 Cash flow from operations for year t21, divided by the total assets at the end of year
t21
ROAt21 Income before extraordinary items for year t21, scaled by the total assets at the end of
year t21
STD_CFOt21 Standard deviation of CFO from years t25 to t21
STD_ROAt21 Standard deviation of ROA from years t25 to t21
RET_VOLt21 Standard deviation of annual stock returns from years t25 to t21
LOG(SALES)t21 Natural logarithm of sales for year t21
NOLt21 Indicator variable for the net operating loss carried forward, set to one if a firm has a net
operating loss carried forward in any of the three years t24 through t21
SF_CASHt21 Cash shortfall variable, calculated as the average of (common and preferred dividends
plus cash flows from investing activities minus cash flows from operations) divided
by the total assets from years t23 to t21
CONSTR_DIVt21 Indicator variable for dividends constraint, defined as one if in any of the previous three
years (i.e. years t23 to t22121) (the retained earnings at year-end plus the cash
dividends and stock repurchases made during the year) divided by (the previous
year’s cash dividends and stock repurchases) is less than two or if the denominator is
zero for all three years. Otherwise, this variable is set to zero
(Continued)
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Variables Description
OPACITYt Firm opacity for year t, defined as the sum of the decile ranks of four individual proxies
for trading volume (reverse ranking), the bid-ask spread, the number of analysts
following (reverse ranking), and the analyst forecast error, standardized to a range
between 0 and 1
LOG(ASSETS)t Natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of year t
FIRM_AGEt Number of years a firm has been listed on COMPUSTAT at the end of year t
R&Dt Research and development expenses for year t, divided by the total assets at the end of
year t
LEVERAGEt Total liabilities divided by the total assets in year t
Appendix 2. Estimation of Stock-Based Compensation
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Qt21 0.0340
∗∗∗ .000
ROAt21 0.0042 .873
CFOt21 0.0291 .540
RETt 0.0074 .503
RETt21 20.0086 .244
STD_ROAt21 0.1408
∗∗ .031
STD_CFOt21 20.0430 .646
RET_VOLt21 0.0380
∗∗∗ .000
LOG(SALES)t21 0.0483
∗∗∗ .000
NOLt21 0.0254
∗∗∗ .000
SF_CASHt21 0.1958
∗∗∗ .000
CONSTR_DIVt21 0.0503
∗∗∗ .000
Industry Fixed Effects Included
Year Fixed Effects Included
Joint F-test for NOLt21, SF_CASHt21, CONSTR_DIVt21 28.86
p-Value .000
N 15,945
Adj. R2 .1321
Notes: This table reports the results from the OLS regression of a CEO’s stock-based compensation for year t on its
determinants from year t21. See Appendix 1 for the variable definitions. All of the continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels. All of the p-values are two-sided and based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year
clustering.
∗∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 1% level.
∗∗Two-tailed significance at the 5% level.
∗Two-tailed significance at the 10% level.
Appendix 1. Continued
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